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I will then take stock of the short-run situa-
tion—our recovery from the 2001 recession. While
we all want a more rapid recovery than we have
observed in recent months, I believe that the evi-
dence supports the view that recovery is underway
and is most likely to continue. Finally, I’ll walk
you through three scenarios of where the economy
might go from here and possible implications of
these alternatives for monetary policy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, especially
Bob Rasche and Kevin Kliesen, for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
LONG-TERM PROGNOSIS
In focusing on the near-term economic out-
look, we too often fail to adequately consider
those forces that ultimately determine our future
living standards. Since expansion of output and
employment is the normal state of the U.S. econ-
omy, the determinants of how rich or poor future
generations will be should always be in the fore-
front of our thinking. Sustained lower inflation,
and the lower inflation expectations that go with
that achievement, and faster productivity growth
have become so accepted as permanent features of
the U.S. economy that we are in danger of taking
them for granted.
If the last 25 years have taught us anything, it
is that our economy does much better when infla-
tion is low and stable and, equally important,
when firms and households expect it to remain
T
hirty-five years ago, in 1967, economists
met at a conference to discuss the ques-
tion, “Is the Business Cycle Obsolete?”
(The conference proceedings were
published in a book with the same title. Martin
Bronfenbrenner, ed., Wiley Interscience, 1969.)
The answer to the question from those proceed-
ings was a tentative “maybe,” with some partici-
pants believing that the cycle was obsolete and
others willing at most to argue that severe down-
turns were a thing of the past. Over the years
since that discussion, history has proven that
the U.S. economy is not recession-proof: the
U.S. economy experienced six recessions—in
1970, 1973-75, 1980, 1981-82, 1990-91, and most
recently in 2001. Moreover, the 1981-82 recession
was pretty severe, with the unemployment rate
rising to just under 11 percent. Although the
business cycle is clearly still a fact of economic
life, expansion, not recession, is the normal state
of our economy.
In assessing the health of an economy, it is
important to differentiate between short-run
fluctuations and long-run trends. A recession is
like a cold, perhaps mild, perhaps miserable, but
it passes in due time. The most important issue
for any economy is its long-run health, not its
inevitable temporary setbacks.
I will first take stock of the underlying trends
in our economy. My conclusion is that the basic
health of our economy in recent years, and most
probably for years to come, is substantially better
than it used to be. Inflation is low and steady
and expected to remain so. Productivity growth
is up, and expected to remain so. Those are two
key features of our economic situation over the
longer run.that way. Clearly, this development did not occur
by accident. The current period of low and stable
inflation occurred because the Federal Reserve
successfully implemented a strategy to achieve
and maintain that outcome. The success of this
policy bolstered the Fed’s credibility with Wall
Street and Main Street, thereby bringing long-run
inflation expectations down to relatively low
levels and reducing the responsiveness of those
expectations to short-run fluctuations in our
price indexes.
Some of you may have vivid memories of
what our situation was like when price level insta-
bility was the norm. Inflation rose after 1965 and
reached a level from 1979 to 1981 that averaged
nearly 11¾ percent a year as measured by the
consumer price index. Given the 1 to 3 percent
rates of inflation that had been the norm during
much of the 1950s and early 1960s, the inflation
of the 1970s was a disturbing development. The
substantial erosion in the purchasing power of
the U.S. dollar from 1965 to 1981 caused great
pain, culminating in the deepest recession since
the Great Depression. Since inflation came down,
we’ve experienced only two recessions, both mild.
Not surprisingly, the effects of rising inflation
caused firms and households to reassess their view
of policymakers’ commitment to price stability.
Inflation expectations rose, starting in about
1968. Doubts about monetary policy gradually
increased, and by the late 1970s the Fed had far
less credibility than it needed to conduct a suc-
cessful monetary policy. The deep recession of
1981-82 was part of the cost of that lost credibility.
By 1980, the Blue Chip Survey of Forecasters
showed expected annual average inflation over
the following 10 years in the range of 7 to 8 per-
cent. Ten years later, the policies of Fed Chairmen
Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan had produced
a sharp drop in inflation expectations: In 1991,
the Philadelphia Fed’s Livingston Survey, the
Blue Chip Survey, and the Survey of Professional
Forecasters all showed that forecasters expected
CPI inflation to average about 4 percent over
the 10-year forecasting horizon. That 4 percent
expected rate for the 1990s was close to actual
experience in the 1980s.
The Fed’s commitment to price stability was
cemented further in the 1990s. Inflation gradually
fell, and by the late 1990s various measures of
expected long-term inflation settled in the neigh-
borhood of 2 to 2½ percent. We have made a lot
of progress on the inflation front. This climate of
price stability provides a substantial base for the
future growth of our economy and it also permits
the Federal Reserve to react much more vigorously
to short-run developments than would otherwise
be the case.
In the long run, a nation’s standard of living,
often measured as the growth of real GDP per
capita, is a function of average labor productivity
growth. Total GDP growth depends on both labor
force and productivity growth. Labor force growth
is a function of population growth and immigra-
tion rates and is relatively constant year by year.
Uncertainty over our long-run prospects for GDP
growth is largely a function of uncertainty over
productivity growth. I’ll concentrate on the sim-
plest productivity measure—labor productivity—
which is output per hour of labor input.
Between 1973 and 1994, the growth of labor
productivity averaged 1.4 percent per year. Since
1995, labor productivity growth has been about
1 percentage point higher. A simple way to see
the implication of this increase in labor produc-
tivity growth is that, at the old rate, output per
worker doubles in 50 years, whereas at the new
higher rate output per worker doubles in 29 years.
Clearly, the long-run benefits of small increases
in annual productivity growth are substantial
when compounded over long periods. Given that
we have an aging population, we have a great
need for this higher productivity growth to pro-
vide the output required to support both the work-
ing population and the increasingly large retired
population.
Economists who have looked at the sources
of productivity acceleration point mostly to the
tremendous increases in the stock of business
capital equipment and software during the last
several years. But the key is not just more capital
per worker. New technology requires changed
business processes to be fully effective. Think of
the ubiquitous nature of point-of-sale scanners,
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ment, computer-assisted design software and
computer-assisted machine cutting tools, cell
phones, copiers, the Internet, and a panoply of
other technological innovations. All of these have
changed the way we do business. New technology
also interacts with government policies and
requires that they change over time. Two impor-
tant areas on this front are reforms in regulatory
policy and reduced restrictions on international
trade to take advantage of efficiencies from serv-
ing and drawing on world markets.
Recent data revisions lowered the estimate of
the average growth rate of labor productivity over
the past three years by about ¼ of a percentage
point. Nevertheless productivity growth remained
robust by historical standards during the 2001
economic recession, giving credibility to the fore-
cast that the productivity slowdown of 1973-94
is indeed truly over.
SHORT-TERM PROGNOSIS
There has been a marked downshift in the
growth of U.S. economic activity since late last
year. Output growth has been modest, and
employment growth almost nil. These develop-
ments are quite naturally a matter of concern.
Most of the press attention is on the growth
of real GDP, but focusing on final sales yields a
better understanding of the recovery process. GDP
is the sum of final sales and inventory investment,
but the inventory cycle can distort the short-run
picture. Early in a recovery period, real GDP
growth is quite typically boosted by an inventory
build-up, or the cessation of an inventory correc-
tion, and that was certainly true of the current
recovery. Final sales provides a cleaner measure
of the underlying strength of aggregate demand.
After rising at a fairly robust 4.2 percent
annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2001, the
growth of real final sales slowed to a 2.4 percent
annual rate during the first quarter of 2002. Then,
in the second quarter, the pace of final sales
ground to a halt—and even contracted a bit—
falling at a 0.1 percent rate. We should not get
hung up on these precise numbers, because the
currently available second quarter data come from
the advance estimate of GDP and its components.
These estimates are subject to revision. But other
information also supports the basic picture of an
economy that is growing only slowly, and that is
the main point.
Clearly, at this stage of the recovery, a stalling
out of growth of real final sales is cause for con-
cern; in a typical recovery period, the economy
is growing much faster at this stage. Part of the
explanation is that the recession was unusually
mild, which leads to the expectation that the
recovery will also be more mild than usual.
Another part of the explanation is that this reces-
sion was concentrated in the area of business fixed
investment; household spending on housing and
consumer durables held up far better than usual
in a recession period.
Although business fixed investment tends to
be highly cyclical, the drop in business capital
spending in 2001 was much larger than usual—
probably because the amount of investment that
took place late in the expansion was excessive—
at least with the benefit of hindsight—particularly
in certain sectors such as telecom. Fortunately,
real investment in equipment and software
increased for the first time in nearly two years
during the second quarter of this year; however,
nonresidential construction spending remains
very weak.
The second quarter is now history, and we
are into the third quarter. At this stage perceptions
of the economy’s strength going forward are
formed both by forecasts and by high frequency
data that are, however, often subject to large revi-
sions. As the data on income, production, and
expenditures come in, they are gauged relative
to our expectations and then the forecasts get
revised accordingly. This process is evident from
a comparison of the July and August Blue Chip
Consensus forecast for real GDP growth over the
second half of the 2002. In July, the Consensus
was roughly 3 percent growth for the third quarter
and 3¾ percent for the fourth quarter. In August,
these projections were marked down to about 2½
and 3 percent growth, respectively.
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the possibility that the economy might slip back
into recession. From an historical standpoint,
the likelihood of a double-dip is remote because
there has only been one such event in the post-
World War II era. The short 1980 recession was
followed by a four-quarter recovery and then by
the deep 1981-82 recession. However, the macro-
economic climate that spawned that double-dip—
high and rising inflation, poor public policies,
and a major oil price shock—is notably absent
this time around. Hence, barring an unpredictable
calamity, I think the probability of a double-dip
recession at the present time is low. Most business
economists share this view, according to the
recent Economic Policy Survey conducted by the
National Association for Business Economics.
What makes a double-dip recession unlikely?
I’ve already talked about the favorable inflation
environment. Expectations of low and stable
inflation can only be described as “entrenched,”
which makes it much easier than would other-
wise be the case for businesses to plan for the
future. The banking system is well capitalized,
unlike the situation after the 1990-91 recession,
which means that credit is readily available to
credit-worthy firms. Monetary and fiscal policy
are both contributing to recovery. Although the
level and volatility of the equity market has
reduced the rate of initial public offerings to a
low level, which makes the financing of new
enterprises more difficult, the financing situation
faced by new enterprises today is typical of early
recovery periods.
Some observers have expressed the worry
that the United States may face the so-called
“Japan problem.” That is, the existing low rate of
inflation may give way to deflation—a persistent
decline in the general price level, leading to per-
sistent stagnation of economic activity. Deflation
can be a serious macroeconomic problem, as U.S.
experience in the 1930s and Japanese experience
from the early 1990s to the present day illustrate.
However, unlike our situation in the 1930s and
Japan in recent years, U.S. money growth has
remained robust and even increased during the
recent economic slowdown. I am unaware of any
deflation experience that has occurred absent a
significant and persistent reduction in monetary
growth rates.
Moreover, the U.S. inflation situation today
is decidedly mixed, with different sectors expe-
riencing different price trends. Although the
prices of many manufactured goods are falling,
prices of medical care, education, and many
other services are rising. As a former university
professor, I’ve often joked that I’ll believe deflation
is upon us when leading universities start cutting
tuition. Housing prices are rising to such an extent
that some are talking of a housing “bubble.” In
Japan, real estate prices declined along with equity
prices. For these and other reasons, I do not see
deflation as a major risk to the economic outlook
for the United States at the present time.
THREE ECONOMIC SCENARIOS
One possible scenario for the path of the
economy over the next few years is that recovery
will proceed about as expected in the consensus
forecast. That outlook has GDP growing at a rate
of about 2½ percent over the second half of this
year. Growth gradually picks up next year and
settles at roughly 3½ percent toward the end of
next year. That rate of growth continues over the
remainder of the forecasting horizon of three or
four years. That is also the average rate of growth
expected over the longer run.
The long-run growth rate is determined by
the economy’s fundamental capacity to produce.
Labor force demographics, determined by the U.S.
birth rate, immigration, and retirements suggest
that the number of people employed will grow
by about 1 percent per year. Add to that source
of growth an estimate of 2½ percent productivity
growth yields GDP growth of 3½ percent per year.
Of course, both of these projections are subject
to error, especially the rate of productivity
growth.
This baseline scenario is widely accepted in
the markets. However, as always, some forecasters
expect faster and some slower growth than the
baseline. Current interest rates also reflect this
baseline expectation. From yields on Treasury
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the market’s expectation of future short-term
interest rates. For example, comparison of the
rate on a 3-year bond with that on a 4-year bond
permits us to calculate an implicit expected 1-
year interest rate three years in the future—the
rate on a 1-year bond to be issued three years from
now. What this calculation shows is that the
market expects the 1-year bond rate to rise steadily
from its current level of about 2 percent. Two years
from now the market expects the 1-year rate to
be 3.8 percent; four years from now, 5.2 percent;
eight years from now, 6.4 percent.
I could refine these interest rate estimates,
but they are good enough for current purposes.
What they show is that the market expects a typi-
cal recovery scenario, with rates rising as GDP
growth picks up and as the margin of unused
labor and capital resources declines. Over time,
as business employs currently excess production
capacity and begins to increase capital spending,
credit demands will rise. In the normal course of
events, we expect corporate profits to rise, which
will finance some but not all of the increased
capital spending. For that reason, businesses will
be raising more funds in the capital markets,
which is part of the explanation of why interest
rates are expected to rise.
All of these characteristics of the baseline
scenario are perfectly standard stuff. But also
perfectly standard is that the actual outcome may
well differ from today’s best guess. The baseline
scenario evolves as data arrive, changing expec-
tations about the future.
Recent experience illustrates this process very
nicely. Consider how the Blue Chip Consensus
forecast for 2002 has changed over time. The Blue
Chip Consensus forecast refers to the annual
average GDP; thus, the numbers I am about to
discuss refer to the annual average GDP for 2002
compared with the annual average for 2001. The
Blue Chip monthly releases, dated the 10th of
every month, are based on a survey taken at the
beginning of the month. That means that fore-
casters are basing their projections on data avail-
able through the first day or two of the month. In
January 2001, the consensus was that GDP growth
for 2002 would be 3.4 percent. The consensus
fell to 2.7 percent in September, just before the
9/11 attacks. The October consensus was 1.5
percent, and the January 2002 consensus for
2002 growth was 1.0 percent.
Incoming data led forecasters to revise their
views about this year. The Blue Chip Consensus
forecast gradually rose, reaching 2.8 percent in
May. Then, the flow of data became less promis-
ing; the current Blue Chip Consensus forecast,
released earlier this month, was 2.3 percent.
As information arrives, interest rates reflect
the changing economic outlook. Consider how
the Treasury 10-year bond rate has moved since
the Fed began to reduce its federal funds rate tar-
get on January 3, 2001. Just before that first policy
action, the 10-year rate was about 5.0 percent.
Following the policy action, the market became
more confident that the economy would escape
recession, and the 10-year rate rose, to almost
5.3 percent at the end of January. Over subse-
quent months, the 10-year rate fluctuated gener-
ally in a range from 4¾ percent to 5¼ percent.
But there were periods of stronger data and greater
optimism about the future, as in May 2001 when
the rate approached 5½ percent. The outlook
became clearly more pessimistic and uncertain
with the 9/11 tragedy, and the bond rate fell to
4.3 percent in early November. But incoming
data were stronger than had been expected; the
bond rate rose to 5 percent in December and on
up to 5¼ percent by May of this year. The con-
sensus forecast was also being revised up during
this period. Since May, incoming data have been
weaker than expected; the 10-year bond rate is
now down to about 4¼ percent, and the Blue
Chip Consensus forecast has been revised down
for both this year and next.
I’ve outlined what the baseline forecast looks
like at this point, but clearly we have to look also
at the possibility that the actual outcome may be
stronger or weaker than the baseline. Let’s look
at the implications of two additional scenarios,
one stronger and one weaker than the baseline.
Remember that the baseline is the one prevailing
today, but tomorrow it may be different. Fore-
casters revise the baseline almost continuously
as incoming information arrives.
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from becoming unduly complicated, let’s assume
that the baseline is correct as to a long-run rate
of GDP growth of about 3½ percent, but wrong
about how fast we get to that long-run growth
rate. Suppose first that the economy approaches
the long-run growth rate more quickly than is
projected in current forecasts. In this case, it is
likely that over the next two years or so, relative
to the baseline projection, business investment
demand will be stronger, equity markets will
recover more quickly, and unemployment will
fall more quickly. As a consequence, short-term
interest rates will also rise more quickly than
current market expectations, and long-term rates
will rise somewhat as well.
The Federal Reserve, of course, will have a
role here. The Fed will want to pursue a policy
to keep inflation low and stable. That policy will
require a higher target federal funds rate, the
interest rate the Fed influences directly through
its open market operations. This is the typical
pattern of a healthy, non-inflationary recovery.
Another possible scenario is that the economy
might experience a longer period of sub-par
growth than in the baseline projection. In this
latter case, short-term interest rates will remain
low for a longer period than in the baseline case.
As the market digests incoming news indicating
that the economy is growing more slowly than
expected, it will lower its expectations of future
short-term rates, which will bring down longer-
term rates. As an example that I hope we will not
observe—because I certainly want to see the econ-
omy recovering more rather than less quickly—
if the picture changes enough that the market
expects that the 1-year rate will remain at about
2 percent for the next five years, then the 5-year
bond rate will fall from its current level of about
3.3 percent to about 2 percent. Similarly, the 10-
year and 30-year bond rates will fall from their
current levels of about 4.3 and 5.1 percent, respec-
tively, to lower levels.
These changes in longer-term rates in the
subpar growth scenario do not assume any
Federal Reserve action to change the target fed-
eral funds rate. In this scenario, the market will
bring down longer-term rates without Fed action
because the market will expect that the Fed will
retain its current low federal funds rate target of
1.75 percent for a longer period than expected in
the baseline scenario.
Keep in mind that this scenario assumes eco-
nomic growth below the baseline. Interest rates
decline because of that assumed outcome, and
so do not prevent it. At the same time, the decline
in rates does serve to limit the extent of economic
weakness. Clearly, declining long rates will tend
to support housing, business fixed investment,
and household spending on consumers durables
such as cars and furniture. In time, the natural
forces of growth will reassert themselves and the
economy will grow at its trend rate determined
by labor force and productivity growth. We will
be disappointed that we didn’t reach trend growth
sooner, but there is no reason to expect that the
U.S. economy will fall into a persistent state of
stagnation.
This analysis suggests that there is a sense in
which the monetary policy situation today is
asymmetric—that sometime in the future there
is a higher likelihood of rising than of falling
short-term rates. That seems to me to be true, but
only because the Fed brought short rates down
so quickly and so far last year that the short end
of the yield curve settled considerably below the
long end. And, remember, the level of long rates
today reflects market expectations that the econ-
omy will recover along a baseline we’ve already
discussed, a recovery fueled by an accommoda-
tive monetary policy and the natural dynamics
of the business cycle.
I certainly do not want to leave the impres-
sion that my position is that there are no circum-
stances under which I would argue that the Fed
should cut the target federal funds rate. The
slow-growth scenario could be so slow, or could
threaten to become an outright decline in employ-
ment and output, that it would make sense for
the Fed to cut the funds rate from its current
level. Or, the United States could suffer some
unforeseen outside shock of the sort all of us are
aware is possible but hate to speculate about.
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inflation, Fed policy will be driven by events
that determine what interest rate policy will be
required to support growth in the context of
maintaining price stability. We may experience
events that shout for a policy response, the way
9/11 did. More likely, we’ll have an accumulation
of evidence that will require judgment to sort out,
leaving ample room for differences of opinion as
to the appropriate size and timing of policy
responses.
CONCLUSION
That we are in our current policy position is
a luxury the Fed has earned by investing in price
stability. Because inflation expectations are so
firmly held, the economy is not super-sensitive
to the timing of monetary policy actions. If the
Fed waits when it might better have acted, the
economy will not run off the rails because the
FOMC will in time act and act vigorously enough
to make up for lost time. Conversely, if the Fed
raises the target federal funds rate too early, when
in retrospect it should have waited, the economy
will either “grow into” the target set by the FOMC
or the FOMC will be able to reverse course with-
out doing significant damage.
In short, the economic recovery does not
depend on the FOMC timing its policy adjust-
ments exactly right. That is an unreasonable
standard to apply to judging the FOMC and fortu-
nately not at all necessary. As I have repeatedly
emphasized, one of the great benefits of achieving
low and stable inflation is that this environment
makes the economy less sensitive to the exact
timing of monetary policy adjustments, because
market participants have entrenched expectations
that the Fed will do what is necessary to maintain
this low-inflation environment for years to come.
I firmly believe that the current macroeco-
nomic situation is more stable in its fundamentals
than it has been over the whole of my professional
life, which goes back to the early 1960s. Neither
I nor anyone else can forecast the short-term out-
look with any great precision, but I am convinced
that those who bet against the long-run health of
the U.S. economy are making a big mistake.
Taking Stock: The State of the Business Recovery
7